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OPINION 
____________ 
 
CHAGARES, Circuit Judge. 
Defendant Jerome Gibson appeals from the District Court’s dismissal of his 
petition for a writ of habeas corpus, brought under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, seeking relief from 
his conviction after a jury trial in Pennsylvania state court.  Gibson raises claims under 
Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), asserting that the prosecution withheld 
impeachment evidence concerning numerous witnesses; a claim of ineffective assistance 
of counsel based on trial counsel’s failure to cross-examine a witness about his inability 
to identify Gibson at a pre-trial lineup; and a cumulative error claim asserting that the 
combination of all the errors was prejudicial.  Because none of these claims have merit, 
we will affirm.  
                                              
  This disposition is not an opinion of the full court and, pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7, 
does not constitute binding precedent. 
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I. 
We write for the parties and so recount only the facts necessary to our decision.  
On September 29, 1994, shortly before 3:00 p.m., an assailant robbed and murdered 
Robert Berger, the owner of Ascher Health Care Center, located on Mill Street in Bristol 
Borough, Bucks County, Pennsylvania.  Berger was shot three times — two .32 caliber 
projectiles were found in his body — and approximately $1,400 and Berger’s .38 caliber 
handgun were stolen.  Two witnesses saw the robbery or its aftermath.  Michael Segal, 
who worked across the street from Ascher Health, saw the assailant struggle with Berger, 
heard gunshots, and saw the assailant rifle through the cash register.  Although unable to 
see the assailant’s face, Segal observed his size and clothing, and testified that Gibson 
matched that description.  The other eyewitness — Alfonso Colon — lived above Ascher 
Health and testified that after hearing gunshots, he went downstairs and saw Gibson 
leaving Ascher Health while stuffing what appeared to be a handgun into his pants.  
Three days after the murder, detectives from the Bucks County District Attorney’s 
Office interviewed Gibson, who denied that he had been in Bristol Borough on the day of 
the murder.  The detectives, however, had a surveillance photo showing that Gibson had 
been in a bank in Bristol Borough that morning.  On October 6, 1994, Gibson was 
arrested and charged with the robbery and murder of Berger, a capital offense.  
The Commonwealth’s theory at trial was that Gibson needed money to buy a new 
car and so decided to commit a robbery.  Various witnesses testified that they saw Gibson 
on the day of the murder in Bristol Borough and in the vicinity of Ascher Health with a 
gun and wearing the hooded sweatshirt and baggy pants of the assailant; that Gibson had 
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told them that he planned to commit a robbery and would kill the victim if needed; and 
that Gibson confessed that he had committed the murder.  The jury found Gibson guilty 
of first-degree murder, robbery, and possession of instruments of crime.   
Gibson was sentenced to death, but during his first state post-conviction 
proceeding under the Pennsylvania Post Conviction Relief Act, (“PCRA”), 42 Pa. Cons. 
Stat. Ann. §§ 9541–46, his sentence was modified to life in prison in light of the trial 
court’s finding that Gibson was mentally disabled.  The remainder of his PCRA petition 
was denied.  Gibson filed his initial habeas petition on January 29, 2010, which he 
supplemented on November 23, 2011 after uncovering new Brady material.  The case 
was then stayed as Gibson filed a second PCRA petition to exhaust his newly discovered 
claims.  This second petition was denied as untimely, the case returned to federal court, 
and the Magistrate Judge issued a Report and Recommendation recommending dismissal 
of the habeas petition.  Gibson filed objections, and on February 29, 2016, the District 
Court dismissed the petition.  The court found that the Brady evidence was not 
cumulatively material and that counsel’s assistance was not ineffective.  The court also 
declined to issue a Certificate of Appealability (“COA”).  Gibson timely appealed, and 
we granted a COA on fourteen of his Brady claims, an ineffective assistance of counsel 
claim, and a cumulative error claim.  
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II.1 
 We first address Gibson’s Brady claims, which relate to eight of the 
Commonwealth’s witnesses:  Eddie Jones, Glenn Pollard, Cyril Thomas, Paulinda 
Moore, Kevin Jones, Eddie Gilbert, Sean Hess, and Herman Carrol.2  The District Court 
did not conduct an evidentiary hearing, so our review of its Order denying habeas relief is 
plenary as to both questions of law and fact.  Slutzker v. Johnson, 393 F.3d 373, 378 (3d 
Cir. 2004).3  To establish a Brady claim entitling him to relief, Gibson must show that (1) 
the “evidence at issue [was] favorable” to him (that is, was exculpatory or impeaching), 
(2) the “evidence [was] suppressed by the State, either willfully or inadvertently,” and (3) 
he was prejudiced because the suppressed evidence was “material.”  Strickler v. Greene, 
527 U.S. 263, 281–82 (1999); Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 432–34 (1995).   
Under Brady, the prosecution bears an affirmative duty to “to learn of any 
favorable evidence known to the others acting on the government’s behalf in the case, 
                                              
1 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241 and 2254.  We have 
appellate jurisdiction to review the certified issues under 28 U.S.C. § 2253. 
2 Gibson discusses a Brady violation concerning a ninth witness — Bernard 
McLean — which the District Court rejected and which was not included in the COA.  
Gibson asks us to consider it anyway, but has offered no reasoning beyond what he 
argued when seeking a COA for why we were wrong to exclude McLean, and we find 
none in the record.  Cf. Gattis v. Snyder, 278 F.3d 222, 225 (3d Cir. 2002). 
3 Normally, when we review a District Court’s resolution of a habeas petition that 
followed a state post-conviction relief process, our de novo review of the petition is 
constrained by the standards established under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death 
Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”) for review of state court merits decisions.  However, the 
District Court did not apply AEDPA to the Brady claims and neither party asserts that the 
District Court erred in failing to do so.  Although parties cannot waive the application of 
AEDPA deference, see, e.g., Gardner v. Galetka, 568 F.3d 862, 879 (10th Cir. 2009) 
(collecting cases), we need not undertake the AEDPA analysis in the first instance, 
because we agree that Gibson’s claims fail even under the more exacting de novo review.  
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including the police,” and to provide it to the defense.  Kyles, 514 U.S. at 437.  Brady and 
its progeny do not, however, impose a duty upon the prosecutor to uncover and disclose 
“information possessed by other government agencies that have no involvement in the 
investigation or prosecution at issue.”  United States v. Pelullo, 399 F.3d 197, 216 (3d 
Cir. 2005) (quoting United States v. Merlino, 349 F.3d 144, 154 (3d Cir. 2003)).  The 
question of materiality is assessed in two parts.  First, a court must “evaluate the tendency 
and force of the undisclosed evidence item by item” in order to determine whether it 
should be considered as part of the materiality analysis.  Kyles, 514 U.S. at 436 n.10.  
Second, it must consider the cumulative effect of all the suppressed evidence to 
determine whether it together is material.  Id.  Evidence is material “if there is a 
reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of 
the proceeding would have been different.”  United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 
(1985).  “A ‘reasonable probability’ is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in 
the outcome.”  Id.  The materiality inquiry is not a sufficiency of the evidence test and the 
fact that enough evidence remains to convict after excluding the tainted evidence is not a 
reason to deny relief.  Kyles, 514 U.S. at 434–35.   
The District Court found that the evidence concerning Cyril Thomas and Kevin 
Jones was not favorable to Gibson and, although concluding that the Commonwealth had 
suppressed evidence concerning the other six witnesses, determined that those violations 
were not cumulatively material.  Gibson challenges the District Court’s determinations 
regarding Cyril Thomas and Kevin Jones, as well as its cumulative analysis 
determination.  Thus, even though the Commonwealth contests the District Court’s 
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determinations regarding the other six witnesses, we need not decide whether the District 
Court correctly assessed the evidence pertaining to them because — with the exception of 
the Gilbert material, which we address separately along with the Cyril Thomas and Kevin 
Jones evidence — we agree that the evidence was not cumulatively material. 
A. 
1. 
 Thomas testified at trial that he received a .38 caliber revolver from Gilbert, who 
in turn had received it from Gibson.  Gibson argues that the prosecution withheld (1) a 
note in Thomas’ juvenile probation file indicating that Bucks County Detective John 
Mullin told the probation officer that if Thomas did not cooperate, then Mullin would 
charge Thomas with possession of the weapon and (2) evidence that when Thomas was 
arrested, police found 80 packets of cocaine on him.  Gibson says that he could have used 
this evidence to impeach Thomas’ motivations for testifying and to show that the 
Commonwealth used threats of prosecution to gain cooperation.   
The District Court found no evidence suggesting that Thomas was threatened with 
a weapons charge, and thus rejected Gibson’s assertion that the withheld evidence could 
have impeached Thomas.  It further concluded that Gibson’s claim based on the cocaine 
report was untimely under AEDPA because Gibson knew about it in 2001 but failed to 
raise it in his initial habeas petition, and it did not relate back to the initial petition.  We 
conclude that the District Court did not err in refusing to consider the evidence.   
Given no evidence that Thomas himself was threatened with prosecution for 
possession of a weapon, there is no reason to believe that he was coerced to testify based 
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on that uncommunicated threat, and so it would not be relevant information for 
impeachment purposes.  Moreover, it is unlikely that such evidence would be admissible 
at trial, given that it relates to uncharged conduct.  See Pa. R. Evid. 608(b).  Although 
inadmissible evidence can still be Brady material where it could lead to admissible 
evidence, Dennis v. Sec’y, Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 834 F.3d 263, 309–10 (3d Cir. 2016) (en 
banc), Gibson has failed to make such a connection.  Mere speculation that the 
suppressed evidence might have led to admissible evidence is insufficient to render 
otherwise inadmissible evidence into Brady material.  See United States v. Agurs, 427 
U.S. 97, 109 (1976); United States v. Ramos, 27 F.3d 65, 71 (3d Cir. 1994) (“We think it 
unwise to infer the existence of Brady material based upon speculation alone.”). 
With regard to the evidence concerning the cocaine, we agree that its suppression 
did not violate Brady, but for a reason other than that relied upon by the District Court.  
See Murray v. Bledsoe, 650 F.3d 246, 247 (3d Cir. 2011) (“We . . . may affirm the 
District Court’s judgment on any basis supported by the record.”).  Whether or not the 
claim relates back to Gibson’s initial petition, the evidence is cumulative and thus 
immaterial under Brady.  Gibson argues that the evidence could have been used to 
impeach Thomas and show that he testified in order to avoid facing charges.  At trial, the 
prosecution elicited testimony that Thomas had pending charges of aggravated assault 
and attempted homicide stemming from the arrest during which the cocaine was found, 
and Gibson’s counsel cross-examined Thomas regarding his cooperation with police 
while in custody on those charges to “help [himself] out of a bad situation.”  Appendix 
(“App.”) 704–06.  Thomas’ substantial motive to cooperate in the face of these serious 
9 
 
charges was apparent; that he also might have faced drug charges would not have given 
him a meaningfully greater incentive to cooperate.  Such cumulative impeachment 
evidence is “superfluous and therefore has little, if any, probative value” and is not to be 
accorded any weight in our materiality analysis.  Lambert v. Beard, 633 F.3d 126, 133 
(3d Cir. 2011) (quoting Conley v. United States, 415 F.3d 183, 189 (1st Cir. 2005)), 
vacated on other grounds, Wetzel v. Lambert, 565 U.S. 520 (2012). 
2. 
Kevin Jones testified at trial that in the Spring of 1994, Gibson told him that he 
planned to commit a robbery in Bristol Borough and was prepared to kill the victim.  He 
added that he saw Gibson in Bristol Borough on the day of the murder and that, while in 
prison a month before Gibson’s trial, Gibson confessed to the crime.  Gibson claims that 
the prosecution withheld a report authored by Bucks County Detective Robert Gergal 
concerning his interview of Eric Jones (Kevin’s brother), which notes that Eric spoke to 
police at Kevin’s behest and that Eric sought assistance with robbery charges in exchange 
for his cooperation on the Gibson case.  Gergal refused to offer a deal but noted that if 
Eric’s information was helpful, the prosecutor could write to the sentencing judge.  
Gibson says that this report could have been used to impeach Kevin (Eric did not testify) 
because the fact that Kevin sent Eric to seek a deal suggests that Kevin had one, too. 
The District Court rejected the claim, finding no evidence that Eric reached any 
deal and thus that the information would not have been useful in cross-examining Kevin.  
We agree.  The report is not relevant to whether Kevin got a deal; if anything, it suggests 
that the prosecution was hesitant to strike deals in exchange for information.  Gibson’s 
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speculation about the implications of the document does not make this otherwise 
irrelevant document “favorable” under Brady.  See Ramos, 27 F.3d at 71. 
3. 
Gilbert testified that on the day of the murder, he saw Gibson with a substantial 
amount of money and that Gibson explained that “he had to make a move, he needed 
money.”  App. 681.  A few days later, Gibson told him that he had robbed “an old white 
guy” in Bristol Borough, killed him after the man saw his face, and had used the money 
to buy a car.  App. 683–84, 686.  Gilbert added that Gibson gave him two guns — one of 
which was Gibson’s, and the other was Berger’s.  Gibson claims that the prosecution 
withheld evidence that Detective R.J. Mills of the Bristol Township Police and the DEA 
were investigating Gilbert for drug sales and that weeks before the murder, Gilbert twice 
sold crack cocaine to a confidential informant.  Gibson argues that this could have been 
used to impeach Gilbert because it showed an incentive to cooperate with the prosecutors. 
Based in part on its conclusion that the Bristol Township police were part of the 
prosecution team because Detective Mills had brought witness Eddie Jones to the 
attention of the prosecutors and had personally accompanied Jones to the interview, the 
District Court found that police reports were suppressed and that the evidence was 
favorable to Gibson because he could have used it to impeach Gilbert.  We disagree. 
Even assuming that Detective Mills’ assistance in securing Eddie Jones’ testimony 
renders the Bristol Township Police part of the Gibson prosecution team for all other 
witnesses, these documents do not constitute Brady material because they could not have 
been used to impeach Gilbert.  For Gibson’s theory to succeed, Gilbert would have had to 
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know that he was under investigation or that he had been caught selling drugs; otherwise, 
he would have had no incentive to cooperate to avoid punishment on a crime he thought 
he had perpetrated without detection.  But nothing in the record indicates that Gilbert had 
such knowledge.  It is thus implausible that Gilbert was cooperating with the prosecution 
to avoid criminal charges that he did not know he was facing, and he could not be 
impeached on that basis.  Gibson cites various cases that he says establish that failure to 
disclose information about a pending investigation would violate Brady.  However, none 
of those cases involved a situation where the witness was unaware of the investigation.   
B. 
Gibson was not prejudiced by the suppressed evidence.  To begin with, none of the 
five impacted witnesses were particularly central to the prosecution’s case.  For instance, 
Eddie Jones, Moore, and Hess testified that Gibson told them that he planned to commit a 
robbery, but so did untainted witness Kevin Jones.  Similarly, Eddie Jones, Pollard, Hess, 
and Carrol testified that Gibson admitted to them that he had committed the murder, but 
so did untainted witnesses Kevin Jones, Gilbert, Bernard McLean, and Kenneth Johnson.   
Moreover, although the Court does not minimize the gravity of suppressing 
evidence — especially evidence of a highly probative nature such as that concerning 
Moore’s mental health and Pollard’s status as a serial informant who had reached a deal 
to testify — both Moore and Pollard’s testimonies were already so thoroughly impeached 
that the jury was in any event unlikely to have credited them.  Pollard’s testimony was 
that he overheard Gibson confessing to the murder to David Margerum and that he 
“wanted to help [himself] out” by reporting it to authorities.  App. 793.  However, 
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Margerum — who had no apparent bias — testified that this conversation never took 
place.  Moore’s testimony revealed a history of unremitting drug and alcohol abuse, that 
she had given police inconsistent statements about her conversation with Gibson, and that 
she had an incentive to testify in order “to get out of jail” after she was arrested on a 
robbery charge.  App. 653–55.  It is simply not conceivable that whatever modicum of 
credibility they retained was what the jury relied upon in finding Gibson guilty.  See, e.g., 
Landano v. Rafferty, 856 F.2d 569, 574 (3d Cir. 1988) (considering impeachment 
evidence immaterial under Brady where the “marginal effect in diminishing [the 
witness’s] perceived credibility would have been negligible”).   
The suppressed evidence relating to Herman Carrol, concerning the possibility that 
he had arranged a deal in exchange for his testimony, was not so different in kind than the 
testimony actually elicited at trial which raised a serious implication that such a deal had 
been arranged.  Cf. Dennis, 834 F.3d at 300 (“[W]e have granted habeas relief on the 
basis of a ‘significant difference’ between the suppressed impeachment and other types of 
impeachment evidence used at trial.” (quoting Slutzker, 393 F.3d at 387)).  The final 
pieces of evidence — that Eddie Jones was a paid police informant and that police 
forcibly kicked in Hess’s mother’s door when they arrested Hess — suggest that Jones 
and Hess had reason to testify in favor of the prosecution.  But the Hess evidence was not 
particularly powerful, in that it required a number of inferential leaps to get from the 
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manner in which the police entered his mother’s house to the conclusion that Hess only 
testified because of police coercion.4   
Finally, aside from the limited impact that the suppressed impeachment evidence 
would have had on the relevant witness’s credibility, the Commonwealth adduced 
substantial independent evidence establishing Gibson’s guilt.  Pamela Harrison — 
Gibson’s cousin — testified that Gibson arrived at her house just after the murder 
occurred wearing a hooded sweatshirt and sweating heavily.  Harrison said that Gibson 
asked to use her bathroom to wash up, took off his sweatshirt to wash it, and was carrying 
a gun.  She added that he left the sweatshirt with her and returned later that night to pick 
it up. 5  Added to this, Gibson lied to police about being in Bristol Borough on that day, 
and two untainted witnesses placed Gibson on Ascher Health’s block at the time of the 
murder.  Lastly, Segal testified that he saw Berger struggling with an assailant in a dark 
hooded sweatshirt who matched Gibson’s size, build, and complexion, and Colon 
testified that after he heard the gunshots, he saw Gibson leave the murder scene.  
In light of the weight of the testimony showing that Gibson was at the scene of the 
crime; had a motive; had said he planned to commit a robbery; had lied to police about 
                                              
4 As to Jones, the Commonwealth asserts that they had disclosed prior to trial that 
Jones was an informant, but not that he was a paid informant.  Gibson counters that the 
Commonwealth fails to cite to record evidence supporting this disclosure, but does not 
expressly deny that such information was provided.   
5 Gibson attempted to undercut Harrison’s testimony by implying that the police 
coerced her by threatening to investigate her brother’s involvement in the murder or by 
prosecuting her and her mother for accepting proceeds from the robbery.  However, no 
evidence supports these allegations aside from Gibson’s own testimony and Harrison 
denies them. 
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his whereabouts; was seen just after the murder carrying a gun, sweating, and trying to 
get rid of the clothing that the suspect was wearing; had admitted to numerous individuals 
that he committed the murder; and was identified in possession of a gun matching the 
murder weapon as well as Berger’s weapon, there is no reasonable probability that the 
jury would have come to a different verdict based on the further impeachment of two 
already incredible witnesses and the minor impeachment of three others, whose testimony 
was amply corroborated by other untainted accounts.  Because the evidence does not “put 
the whole case in such a different light as to undermine confidence in the verdict,” we 
agree that there was no Brady violation.6  Kyles, 514 U.S. at 435 
III. 
Gibson next argues that counsel’s assistance was ineffective because he failed to 
cross-examine Segal on his inability to identify Gibson in a pre-trial lineup.  We disagree.  
We review ineffective assistance of counsel claims based on the test set forth in 
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), which has two requirements:  that 
“counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness,” id. at 688, 
and that but for the deficient representation, it was reasonably probable that “the result of 
                                              
6 Although we find that in this case the multiple items of suppressed evidence 
were not cumulatively material, we emphasize that “[t]he prudent prosecutor will resolve 
doubtful questions in favor of disclosure,” Kyles, 514 U.S. at 439 (quoting Agurs, 427 
U.S. at 108), and “[s]uch disclosure will serve to justify trust in the prosecutor as ‘the 
representative . . . of a sovereignty . . . whose interest . . . in a criminal prosecution is not 
that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done,’” id. (quoting Berger v. United 
States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935)).  
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the proceeding would have been different,” id. at 694.  We may decide a Strickland claim 
based on either prong of the analysis.  See id. at 697.   
Segal never claimed to have been able to identify the assailant positively; on direct 
examination, he forthrightly said that he could not make a facial identification.  Indeed, 
when delivering his jury instructions, the judge reiterated that: 
Now, with respect to Mr. Segal, of course, he didn’t really make an identification.  
As you will recall, here in court he was unable to identify the defendant as the 
person he says he saw engaged in the robbery in the store, and the person he saw 
leaving. . . .  All he did was give a description, the police a description, and maybe 
he gave a couple different descriptions.  
 
App. 1008–09.  The jury was thus well aware that Segal could not identify Gibson and 
that his descriptions of the assailant had shifted.  Gibson bears the burden of establishing 
prejudice, Strickland, 466 U.S. at 696, and, having failed to do so, his claim fails. 
IV. 
Gibson finally argues that all of these alleged errors cumulatively prejudiced him.  
“The cumulative error doctrine allows a petitioner to present a standalone claim asserting 
the cumulative effect of errors at trial that so undermined the verdict as to constitute a 
denial of his constitutional right to due process.”  Collins v. Sec’y of Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 
742 F.3d 528, 542 (3d Cir. 2014).  Neither Gibson’s Brady nor Strickland claims resulted 
in any prejudice, and they no more do so when considered together.  Each witness who 
was impacted by a Brady violation was either already incredible or else unnecessary to 
the jury’s determination.  The addition of counsel’s failure to cross-examine Segal does 
not move the needle because it did not plausibly have any effect on the jury’s decision, 
let alone a significant one.  There is no likelihood that the cumulative impact of the errors 
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“had a substantial and injurious effect or influence” on the jury’s verdict, id., and so 
Gibson’s claim fails. 
V. 
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s order. 
